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The rapid expansion of business incubators in Korea is one of the most important phe-
nomena affecting the high-tech industries in Korea. This paper presents the current
conditions of Korean incubators and proposes what factors are important for their con-
tinual development. First, we present how rapidly this new organizational model, busi-
ness incubation, expanded in Korea after the IMF bailout crisis. Second, we explore fac-
tors that lead these incubators to perform better. We emphasize that better qualified
technical, managerial, and administrative support of incubators are important success
factors. However, we also argue that better networked incubators perform better. By
better networked incubators, we mean the incubators that can provide the incubatees
(start-ups) with effective internal networking (e.g., alliance among incubatees) and suf-
ficient external networking as well (e.g., technical support from outside experts, profes-
sional assistance from outside consultants, support from the central and local govern-
ments, etc.). We agree to the earlier literature that encouraging networking among
incubatees is an important success factor for incubators. In this paper, we also suggest
that external networking and outsourcing are significant components in the case of
Korea where most of incubators are not self-sufficient in providing services and support
to incubatees. 
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BUSINESS INCUBATION IN THE GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONTEXT
The rapid expansion of business incubators in Korea is one of the most
important phenomena affecting the high-tech industries in Korea. After the
1997 financial crisis, Korean economy in general and the high-tech industry
in particular attempt to shift its business paradigm. The “economy of scale”
models of large businesses have been seriously criticized and given way to
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the entrepreneurial models of small firms. From the perspective of employ-
ees, capital markets, and even the government, the emphasis has shifted
from the old economy, dominated by big business groups, to the new econo-
my, led by startups and entrepreneurs. This shift was evident in the estab-
lishment of a new capital market, the KOSDAQ, a market modeled after the
NASDAQ and devised for technology and small startup firms. The emer-
gence of venture capital industry represented a diffusion of the Silicon
Valley model to Korea. This shift has created a large group of entrepreneurs
who establish their own firms and pursue their ideas rather than being
employees of Chaebol companies. In addition, this change has produced the
proliferation of a new type of organizations, business incubators that pro-
vide physical workspace as well as technical, legal, managerial, and finan-
cial support to new startup companies. This study explores the history and
present state of the Korean business incubating industry and examines fac-
tors that lead incubators to better perform.
Business incubator is a broad umbrella term referring to any organization
that provides physical workspace, management assistance, access to financ-
ing, and technical and other supporting services to young firms and helps
them survive and grow during the startup stage. The concept of business
incubation, which emerged during the 1970’s in the US and Europe, is
exploding in popularity all over the world as a modern business model.
According to the National Business Incubation Association (NBIA) esti-
mates, there were approximately 15 incubators in North America as of 1980,
but today 600 incubators are located in North America alone. There are
approximately 2,500 incubators worldwide (NBIA 1997; Lalkaka and
Schaffer, 1998).1
Nowadays, we can easily find this concept and business activity in devel-
oping economies and non-Western countries. There are close to 100 incuba-
tors in the People’s Republic of China. Also, in the Ukraine and Poland
incubators are being developed in an attempt to create an entrepreneurial
economy. The Japanese government recently announced a new initiative
aimed at encouraging such an entrepreneurial culture. In the Republic of
Korea, the incubation industry is growing fast with the proliferation of e-
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1 This concept also rapidly expands into various industries. The earliest incubation pro-
grams were focused on a variety of technology companies or on a combination of light indus-
trial, technology and service firms — today referred to as general purpose incubators.
However, in more recent years, new incubators have been developed targeting industries
such as food processing, medical technologies, space and ceramics technologies, and wood-
working. Incubators have even been created for arts and crafts and for retail firms. Programs
have also been targeted to the needs of women and minorities, environmental endeavors, and
telecommunications.
businesses and the boom of the venture-funded economy. As of March 2006
there are 274 business incubators in Korea which are registered in and spon-
sored by a governmental unit, Small and Medium Business Administration.
In the case of Korea, the number of incubators grew dramatically follow-
ing the 1997 IMF financial bailout crisis. The central government initiated
the incubating programs and provided subsidies to universities, research
institutes, and local governments who wanted to establish business incuba-
tors. In addition to the support of the Small and Medium Business
Administration, for instance, the Ministry of Information and
Communication (MIC) has highlighted its supporting plans for start-up
companies through their Software Support Centers and
Information/Telecommunication Start-up Support Centers. The MIC is also
operating high-tech business incubators in the Silicon Valley. In Korea,
Business incubators have proliferated after the financial crisis as a means of
invigorating the economy through venture-funded companies and re-orga-
nizing the national industrial structure to a high-tech oriented one, which
has been led and supported by the central government.
Despite the increasing number of business incubators, many problems in
the operation of those incubators have surfaced due to the lack of training of
capable incubation managers and staffs, poorly structured incubator post-
management and networking, and failure to adapt to the local business
environments. This paper presents the current conditions of Korean incuba-
tors and proposes factors that are important for their continual develop-
ment. In the following sections we briefly sketch the historical development
and the current state of business incubation in Korea.
DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS INCUBATION IN KOREA
The origins of business incubation in Korea can be traced to the early
1990’s. The practice, however, did not gain widespread momentum until
1998 when the Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) and
several other governmental agencies started to finance business incubators
and placed entrepreneurial companies in those incubators. The concept of
business incubation was first introduced in Korea in 1991 when the
Production Technology Research Center was established and operated
“Technology Incubators,” the predecessor of today’s Technology Business
Incubators (TBI). This was a benchmarking of the NASA technology trans-
fer project. Support to entrepreneurs came in the form of a three-step
process: pre-foundation consulting, supervision of the start-up stage, and
production of a test-product - from technology development to commercial-
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ization. Such support, however, was “out-of-wall.” The center did not pro-
vide physical workspace, managerial skills, and access to financing. Rather,
it narrowly focused on support with technological development.
The business incubation model of companies physically being located
within the incubator was set up in 1993 with the establishment of the
Youngdong Business Incubation Center. This concept of in-house business
incubation was even more elaborated and developed after the Small
Business Corporations (SBC) started designating and supporting incubators.
Currently the SBC operates 9 incubators, including the Ansan Business
Incubation Center. In 1994, Korea Advanced Institute for Science and
Technology (KAIST) started an incubating center as a predecessor of their
current new-technology support arm.
Business incubation in Korea only came into full swing following the 1997
IMF bailout crisis. Prompted by the IMF bailout, light was shed on the
necessity to restructuring the economy from a traditional industry-based,
large scale economy to a knowledge-based, small scale one. In addition,
unemployment issue was raised as a serious must-solve problem at the
time. Accordingly, from 1998 the Small and Medium Business
Administration (SMBA) and the Ministry of Information and
Communication (MIC) kick-started support operations on business incuba-
tion projects as a measure of consolidating the foundation of new technolo-
gy-based industries, establishing a knowledge-based economy, and creating
new jobs.
On a parallel front, as the decentralization and regionalization of econom-
ic power became prevalent, local governments began a race to specialize
and develop their local economies, and this turned their attention to busi-
ness incubation. Nowadays, the number of business incubation projects
with private sector involvement is also increasing. Technology in the
telecommunications and biotechnology sectors is advancing at an amazing
pace and so is the number of new companies in this area. Companies in the
private sector are positioning themselves to gain the edge in these sectors by
operating business incubators of their own in order to obtain cutting-edge
technologies or establish partnerships with start-ups in such areas.
PRESENT STATE OF BUSINESS INCUBATION IN KOREA
In Korea, central government-led business incubation is the most preva-
lent. Among such incubation projects, SMBA’s designation and support of
business incubators and MIC’s Software Support Centers and
Information/Telecommunications Start-up Support Centers take up the
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largest piece of the governmental incubation pie. Public sector-led business
incubation operations are also run by the Ministry of Commerce Industry
and Energy (MOCIE)’s TBI arm, the Ministry of Science and Technology’s
new-technology business incubation support arm, Ministry of Culture and
Tourism’s Culture Industry Support Centers, and the direct or indirect
involvement of local governments. Business incubation in the private sector
has also gained momentum recently, and such projects are actively being
pursued.
In this study, we focus on the business incubators designated by SMBA as
of January 2002. SMBA’s involvement in business incubation started with
Small Business Corporation’s (SBC) Ansan Business Incubation Center in
1992. Extensive involvement in business incubation, however, started in
1998. Until 1997 the SMBA designated and supported only 12 business incu-
bators. The number of incubators increased to 30 by 1998. In 1999 and 2000,
89 and 96 were added respectively. As of January 2002 there were 259 busi-
ness incubators that are, on average, 23 months old (see Figure 1). 
The Small Medium Business Administration designates host organiza-
tions (e.g., universities) and supports them to establish incubators in the
form of direct financial aid for construction, expansion, renovations, and
facilities costs. From 2001, aid for operating costs is also provided to the
incubators classified as Distinguished Business Incubators. In addition, the
SMBA is focusing on enhancing the incubation capabilities of the centers
through indirect support. Indirect support includes encouraging networks
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FIGURE. 1. GROWTH IN NUMBER OF INCUBATORS
among incubators through the formation of the Korea Business Incubation
Association, training incubation managers, SMBA managers supporting
incubatees through site visits, and providing incubatees with professional
support through SMBA’s expert pools in various fields.
There are mainly two different types of business incubators: Business
Incubator (BI) for incubation operations open to all industry-types and
Internet Business Incubator (IBI) for operations targeting Internet related
incubatees. As of January 2002 there are 27 Internet business incubators and
232 general business incubators. The majority of the incubators (84.2%) are
hosted by universities, and the rest of them (15.8%) are run by private com-
panies, local governments, research institutes, and Small Business
Corporations (SBC). The incubators are also unevenly but widely distrib-
uted all over the country. The geographical breakdown is: 75 incubators in
Seoul and Kyunggi areas, 41 in Busan/Kyungnam/Ulsan, 37 in
Daejon/Chungnam, 31 in Daegu/Kyungbuk, 25 in Kwangu/Chonnam, 15
in Chonbuk, 13 in Kangwon, 13 in Chungbuk, and 2 in Cheju.
Of the incubators, 79.9 % have less than 20 available incubating rooms to
rent out to startup companies. Only 8.9 % of the incubators have more than
30 rooms. The 259 incubators have an average of 17.26 (a median of 15)
rooms. In total, the 259 incubators possess 4,471 incubating rooms. Most of
incubators (89.2%) report that they nurture less than 20 incubatees (tenant
startup companies). 10.8 % of incubators report that they house and provide
services for more than 21 incubatees. As of January 2002 the 259 incubators
take care of an average of 13.15 (a median of 12) incubatees. On average,
every incubator has 3 to 4 unoccupied rooms. In total, the 259 incubators are
nurturing 3,045 incubatees and leave 1,426 rooms unoccupied. By incuba-
tees we mean startup companies that are located in and nurtured by an
incubator.
In terms of the length of incubation, 169 incubators (65 %) provide 2 year
hatching (incubation) programs and 90 incubators (35 %) offer 1 year pro-
grams. In most cases, if the tenant companies want, incubators extend one
more year of hatching time. By hatching time we mean the period (the num-
ber of months or years) an incubatee spends in the incubator.
The incubators also report an average of 5.4 (a median of 2) graduates
since they have founded. However, many incubators (36%), especially
young ones, have not produced a graduate. 84 % of incubators report that
they have graduated less than 10 companies. Only 16 % of the 259 incuba-
tors report that they have produced 11 or more graduates. In total, the 259
incubators have graduated 1,398 companies. Among them, 7 companies
have made initial public offerings (IPO) by 2002. By graduates we mean
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incubatees that have left the incubators and no longer receive the services
from the incubators. This indicator (the number of graduates) will be used
as our dependent variable to measure the performance of incubators in the
later section of this paper.
The 259 Korean incubators employ a median of 3 people (people working
for the incubators, not the incubatees) that include full-time managers and
administrators. 78 % of incubators have fewer than 4 full time employees.
These figures clearly show that most incubators in Korea do not employ
enough people. According to Hansen et al (2000) the 169 incubators world-
wide in their survey sample employed a median of 15 people. In this
respect, it is crucial for the incubators in Korea to find qualified partners
and experts to outsource their services.
Throughout the historical background of Korean incubators, we find how
rapidly this new organization model, business incubation, has expanded in
Korea since the IMF bailout crisis. In the following section, we explore what
factors lead these incubators to perform better. 
FEATURES OF SUCCESSFUL INCUBATORS
Several earlier studies (Campbell, 1989; Latona & LeHere, 1989; Allen &
McCluskey, 1990; Rice & Matthews, 1995; Martin, 1997; OECD, 1997;
Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, & Sull, 2000; Hansen, Nohria & Berger, 2000)
identify the features of successful incubation programs. Examining either a
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FIGURE. 2. NUMBER OF GRADUATES
single case or a sample of incubators, these studies explore various issues
such as the identity of the partners, the range of services offered, the net-
works in place, the mix of companies, and the skills of the management
team. 
Campbell (1989) identifies low costs of developing and operating incuba-
tors as well as quality management of facilities as features contributing to
the effectiveness of incubators. Latona and LeHere (1989) isolate several
success factors including an aggressive entrepreneurial outreach program, a
small business assistance center, access to sources of capital, and incubator
facilities. Allen and McCluskey (1990) find that age and size of incubators
are important determinants of successful incubation programs indicated
with the number of jobs created and firms graduated. Rice and Matthews
(1995) highlighted effective intervention as a critical feature. Martin (1997)
identifies flexible space, clear entry criteria, a maximum length of stay, man-
agement by a business development agency, and clear priority placed on
networking. However, in the same year the OECD (1997) isolates a different
series of factors: the objectives and mission, an entrepreneurial manager,
focus on cluster based technologies, tenant selection, local and international
linkages, and diversified sources of finance.
In later studies, the ability to facilitate networking emerges as a key differ-
entiating factor (Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, & Sull, 2000; Hansen,
Nohria, & Berger, 2000). Hansen and the colleagues argue that one type of
incubator, called a networked incubator, represents a new organizational
model successfully suited to growing high-tech businesses. It shares com-
mon features with other incubators in the sense that it provides incubatees
with physical workspace, equipment, and administrative and managerial
support. However, its key distinguishable feature is its ability to encourage
networking among incubatees and help start-ups to meet with potential
business allies. Networking among start-ups includes a wide variety of
activities from informal interactions such as having daily casual conversa-
tions and idea sharing to more formal activities such as forming technology
partnerships and sharing interlocking directorates. Hansen et al. stress that
networking among incubatees is a crucial component to make incubators
more successful.
We agree that encouraging networking among incubatees is an important
success factor for incubators. In this paper, we also suggest that in addition
to the activities of internal networking, external networking and outsourc-
ing are significant components in the case of Korea where most of incuba-
tors are not self-sufficient in providing services and support to incubatees.
In the following section, we hypothesize what factors lead incubators to bet-
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ter perform.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
A resource dependence perspective emphasizes the importance of the
continuing provision of resources - personnel, money, technology, and social
legitimacy -for organizational survival in an uncertain environment (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). In particular, studies from the resource dependence per-
spective have focused on the process by which organizations mobilize
resources through external ties with other organizations. These studies sug-
gest that the ability of organizations to manage resource dependence rela-
tions is determined largely by the structural context, such as the distribution
of resources among organizations (e.g., Burt, 1983; Pfeffer, 1987; Baker,
1990). More recently, some scholars have begun to study the path-depen-
dency of interorganizational resource dependence by showing that the accu-
mulation of prior interorganizational ties affects the formation of future ties
(e.g., Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). A broad finding in this research
is that an organization’s performance is mainly dependent upon the organi-
zation’s position in the structural or historical resource dependence context.
However, few empirical resource dependence studies to date have exam-
ined how emerging small firms survive the competition with more estab-
lished larger firms. Compared with mature firms, start-up firms are at a dis-
advantage when accessing critical information and resources, and they have
less experience in interorganizational resource exchange. According to the
resource dependence prediction, the start-up firms will have a very low
chance of survival or, at most, will struggle to compete for a short time.
However, we observe that there are many start-ups, and some even flourish.
How can start-ups overcome the lack of access to external resources?
Our study assumes that, among others, incubating form of organizations
is devised to help start-ups to mobilize external resource critical to their sur-
vival and success. Incubators enable their incubatees to gain access to
human/financial resources and management expertise. Given this role of
the incubating system on resource mobilization, our study investigates
which incubators are more successful in making a start-up independent and
self-sustaining. More specifically, we focus on two dimensions in the incu-
bating relationship: an incubator’s direct and indirect provision of resources.
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The Range and Quality of Services
In addition to physical workspace, incubators provide incubatees with a
wide range of services as a way to strengthen the ability of the incbatees to
survive and prosper. They offer important direct services such as shared
administrative services, management and marketing assistance, accounting
and legal services, and technology consulting. In more detail, the services
provided by incubators include photocopying, fax, secretarial assistance,
business and marketing planning, legal assistance, bookkeeping service,
recruiting assistance, intellectual property assistance, and so on. By taking
all the mundane cares of building business and management, incubators
enable startup companies to focus solely on product development (Finer &
Holberton, 2002).
Hypothesis 1. Incubators that provide a wider range of services and
resources perform better.
To accomplish better quality services, we also argue that incubators need
more full-time staffs and experts. Incubators need a substantial number of
employees who are able to guide and support incubatees through the early
stages of growth.
Hypothesis 2. Incubators with more number of full time staffs perform
better.
Outsourcing — Leveraging Existing Services
Incubators in Korea are often too small to provide an extensive scale of
management and technology services. As we have presented, the 259
Korean incubators employ a median of 3 people that include full-time man-
agers and administrators. 78% of incubators have fewer than 4 full time
employees. These figures show that although incubators need a relatively
sizable complement of business experts, technical personnel, and adminis-
trators to guide and help tenant companies through the early stages of
growth, most of incubators in Korea do not employ enough number of peo-
ple. According to Hansen et al. (2000), The 169 incubators worldwide in
their survey sample employed a median of 15 people. In this respect, it is
crucial for incubators in Korea to find qualified partners and experts to out-
source their services. Outsourcing and alliance strategies of incubators can
help tenant startups better access existing resources and assistance such as
technical support from outside experts, managerial assistance from consul-
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tants, legal advices from law firms, and accounting and bookkeeping ser-
vices from outside accountants. 
Hypothesis 3. Incubators that do not outsource their services perform
worse.
Networking Activities
So far, we emphasize that better qualified technical, managerial, and
administrative support of incubators are important success factors.
However, we also argue that better networked incubators perform better. By
better networked incubators, we mean the incubators that can provide the
incubatees with effective internal networking (e.g., networking activities
among incubatees) and sufficient external networking as well (e.g., net-
working with graduates, outside companies, financial institutions, local
governments, research institutions, and venture capitals).
Hypothesis 4. Incubators that provide more networking activities per-
form better.
In sum, Figure 3 illustrates an incubating system, where IR denotes an
incubator, IE denotes an incubatee, and MA denotes other market actors
including bankers, suppliers, and customers. Our first and second hypothe-












FIGURE. 3. RESOURCE FLOWS IN THE INCUBATING FORM OF ORGANIZATIONS
ses concerns how the diversity and intensity of the services an incubator
provides directly help the incubatees to be an independent firm (solid line
in Figure 3). Our third and fourth hypotheses emphasize the role of an incu-
bator as an agent, or gatekeeper of mobilizing external resources for its
incubatees. On the one hand, an incubator’s resource ties with external
actors (subcontractors in our paper) may provide its incubatees with indi-
rect access to those resources (dotted line). On the other hand, the incubator
may introduce critical market actors to their incubatees so that the incuba-
tees can utilize the actors as their resource ties (dashed line).
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHOD
Data and Sample
We are primarily studying and collecting data on 259 incubators regis-
tered in Small and Medium Business Administration as of January 2002.
Initial data on those incubators were collected from the Small and Medium
Business Administration to assess the characteristics of Korean incubators
(e.g., age, size, types of service, full-time support, outsourcing, networking
activities, etc.) and their performance (e.g., number of graduates). For the
main analyses to evaluate the present performance, we selected 123 incuba-
tors founded before February of 2000.
As presented in Table 1, the mean age of the sample is 36 months (3 years)
as of January 2002. They have an average of 19 available rooms. They
employ 3 full time workers to nurture 14 startups on average. They have
produced a mean of 9.1 graduates since they established.
Dependant Variable
We use the total number of graduates (logged) as of May 2002 as a depen-
dent variable to measure the performance of incubators. We sampled rela-
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TABLE 1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INCUBATORS IN KOREA, 2002
Population Sample
(259 Incubators) (123 Incubators)
Mean Age (as of January 2002) 23 Month 36 months
Mean Size (available room numbers) 17 rooms 19 rooms
Mean Number of Incubatees 13 startups 14 startups
Mean Number of Graduates 5 companies 9 companies
Mean Number of Full-Time Workers 3.3 people 3.3 people
tively mature incubators that already experienced one cycle of hatching
time (12 or 24 months) which allows sufficient time to produce graduates.
Independent Variables
Service Coverage. Incubators were asked if they covered the following 20
areas of service: (1) secretarial assistance (2) photocopying (3) fax and tele-
phone service (4) mailing service (5) computer program support (6) data
processing support (7) documentation assistance (8) Bookkeeping assistance
(9) security service (10) webpage support (11) business plan writing support
(12) recruiting assistance (13) corporation/factory establishment support
(14) contracting and licensing assistance (15) IPO/M&A support (16) patent
and intellectual property assistance (17) various legal issue support (18) 24
hour open system support (19) unrestrained facility usage support, and (20)
facility rental fee discount. We added up the responses for the 20 service
areas and compiled an index of 0 to 20. If an incubator covers all the service
areas mentioned above, it gets 20, and if an incubator provides none of the
services, it scores 0.
Full-Time Support. We employed the number of full time employees of
incubator as an indicator of measuring an organizational capacity for better
quality support. The full time workers include managers and administra-
tors.
Outsourcing. We surveyed if any of the 10 major supporting areas of incu-
bators is outsourced or not. The 10 major supporting activities include (1)
management consulting (2) technology and engineering support (3)
research and development support (4) legal support (5) marketing and sales
support (6) administration support (7) financing support (8) patenting sup-
port (9) accounting support and (10) other company/industry specific
demand support. We created a dummy variable coded 1 if none of these
supporting areas is outsourced.
Networking Activities. We surveyed if incubators support six internal
and external networking activities. Six networking activities include (1) net-
working among incubatees (2) networking with graduates (3) networking
with outside companies (4) networking with financial institutions (5) net-
working with research institutions and (6) networking with venture capi-
tals. We include in the model a dummy variable to represent high network-
ing actives. If an incubator supports 5 or 6 networking activities, we consid-
er it as a high networking incubator.
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND BUSINESS INCUBATION 41
Control Variables
We also control several organizational capacity variables such as size
(total number of available incubating rooms), age (in month), and location
of incubators (if the incubator is located in Seoul or Kyongki areas).
ANALYSIS
We perform a multiple regression analysis that examines what factors
affect the performance of incubators in Korea.
RESULTS
As shown in Table 2, the results present that general organizational capac-
ity matters as the effects of control variables show. Incubator’s size and age
show positive and significant effects on incubator’s performance. Big and
old incubators are more likely to produce graduates. The location of incuba-
tor does not show a significant relationship with the incubator’s perfor-
mance in our model. 
Table 2 also shows that the results support the hypotheses. As stated in
Hypothesis 1, Incubators produce more graduates when they offer a broad-
er coverage of service areas, if other conditions being equal. The 123 incuba-
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Incubator Size (total number of rooms) + .015** (.007)
Incubator Age (in month) + .027** (.006)
Location (Seoul or Kyongki areas) +/- -.283 (.179)
The coverage of Service Areas +, Hypothesis 1 .058** (.029)
Full Time Support (Number of Full Time Staff) +, Hypothesis 2 .154** (.071)
No Outsourcing -, Hypothesis 3 -.289* (.159)
Strong Networking Support +, Hypothesis 4 .386** (.201)
Constant -.257 (.552)
R Square .304
Number of Cases 123
(1) Dependent Variable: Total Number of Graduates (logged).
(2) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
(3) * p < .10
** p < .05
tors cover a mean of 15.6 (a median of 16) out of 20 service areas. When
incubators provide large service coverage (19 or 20 service areas), they pro-
duce 13.4 graduates on average, while they graduate only 7.5 startups when
they offer below-average service coverage (16 or less areas).
The number of full time employees of an incubator shows a significant
and positive effect on the performance (Hypothesis 2). Simple mean com-
parisons also support this finding. Incubators that employ 3 or more full
time workers produce an average of 12.8 graduates, while incubators with
fewer full time employees produce 8.5 graduates on average.
As predicted in Hypothesis 3, when incubators do not outsource, they
perform worse. In our sample the 64 incubators that outsource at least one
of their major supporting areas produce more number of graduates (an
average of 10 graduates) than the 59 incubators that do not outsource the
services (an average of 8 graduates).
Finally, as predicted in hypothesis 4, better networked incubators produce
more graduates. Incubators providing high networking support (5 or 6 net-
working activities) in our sample graduate more startups (an average of 12.5
graduates) than low networking incubators (that produce 8.2 graduates on
average). In particular, incubators that support networking between tenant
startups and graduates produce significantly larger number of graduates
(an average of 15.6) than incubators that do not offer networking with grad-
uates. As illustrated in Figure 4, through all six networking indicators, we
observe the positive relationships between networking activities and the
performance of incubators. Supporting Hansen et al. (2000), Figure 4 illus-
trates that the internal networking activities (networking among incubatees)
are important. In addition, according to our results, the external networking
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FIGURE. 4. NETWORKING ACTIVITIES AND PERFORMANCE
activities are also significant factors to make incubators perform better. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study explores the history and present state of business incubation
program in Korea. The incubation program in Korea has expanded rapidly
with full support of the central government after the 1997 IMF bailout crisis.
The Korean government has encouraged the expansion of incubation pro-
gram as a way to restructure the national economy from a traditional indus-
try-based, large scale economy to a knowledge-based, small scale one. In
addition, unemployment was being raised a serious must-solve problem
after the financial crisis hit Korea. Accordingly, from 1998 the Small and
Medium Business Administration (SMBA) and the Ministry of Information
and Communication (MIC) started support operations on business incuba-
tion projects as a measure of enhancing the foundation for new technology-
based industries, establishing a knowledge-based economy, and creating
new jobs.
This paper also examines what factors lead incubators to perform better.
Specifically, we find that incubators become more productive when they
provide incubatees with a wide variety of technical, managerial, and admin-
istrative supports of better quality. Better quality service becomes possible
when incubators employ enough full time workers. However, 78% of incu-
bators in Korea employ fewer than 4 full time workers. As a result, the incu-
bators not only need to hire more number of employees but also should
develop effective strategies to utilize their alliances and to outsource the ser-
vices in order to better support the incubatees. For highly labor intensive sit-
uations, we argue that effective outsourcing is another crucial factor to
increase the productivity of incubators.
In addition, we argue that better networked incubators perform better.
Only 20% of the incubators in our sample are offering active networking
services to their tenant companies. According to previous research and our
results, active internal and external networking is a key source of successful
incubation programs. Successful incubators should be able to promote inter-
nal networking among incubatees and develop external networking with
various actors such as graduates, venture capitals, local governments, and
research institutions.
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